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high and rising living standards.  Yet acceptance of persistent high unemployment, stagnant 
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primacy afforded shareholder value over human resource considerations in American firms and 
the longstanding gridlock over employment policy.  I suggest that a new jobs compact will be 
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America’s Human Capital Paradox 
 
Thomas A. Kochan 
 
 
There is widespread recognition that human capital has to serve as a significant asset for 
the American economy to be competitive and to support a high and rising standard of living. 
This poses a paradox.  Given this, why does society tolerate high and persistent unemployment 
and underemployment? Why do so many U.S. firms place a low priority on human resource 
relative to financial and shareholder considerations? Why is it that wages of the majority of the 
labor force have stagnated for three decades while income inequality continues to grow, job 
satisfaction continues to decline, and unions are under constant attack by private and public 
employers? These are symptoms of an economy that undervalues work and the workforce, and 
lacks the institutions, policies, and practices needed to translate the rhetoric surrounding the 
importance of human capital into reality.  
Failure to address this paradox will ensure continued decline in the standard of living for 
current and future generations of Americans.  Since there is no single cause of these trends, there 
is no single solution. Moreover, since most of these trends predate the onset of the 2007–2009 
recession, solutions are not likely to be natural byproducts of a normal economic recovery. 
Instead, a systemic and sustained set of changes in policies, practices, power, and norms will be 
needed to turn rhetoric about the importance of human capital into reality for the workforce and 
the economy. To do so, I propose that four key stakeholder and leadership groups—business, 
labor, education, and government—begin working toward consensus on a new, long-term Jobs 
Compact for America, one that addresses the root causes of the failure to take human capital 
seriously. The compact will need to consider significant changes in each of these institutions and 
in the interactions among them. This includes corporations and the overall business community; 
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unions, professional associations, and other groups that give voice to the workforce; government 
policymakers and administrators; and educators who prepare and update the knowledge, skills, 
and abilities of the current and future workforce. 
ROOT CAUSES 
Most labor market research focuses on identifying and quantifying the effects of specific 
causal forces, such as changes in skills and technologies, global trade, or declines in institutions 
such as unions or investments in education or training on a specific labor market outcome. While 
that is highly appropriate for furthering knowledge and policy making, it is also necessary to 
look deeper at the root causes of the failure to prioritize human capital considerations in public 
and private decision making that give rise to and perpetuate the combination of labor market 
outcomes noted above. Indeed, I believe there is a set of identifiable market and institutional 
failures that explain why human capital considerations are not elevated to a level needed to serve 
as a competitive advantage for the nation.  
The essence of the market failure problem is that what is good for individual U.S. 
companies is no longer automatically good for American business, workers, or the economy. 
Former IBM executive and Sloan Foundation President Ralph Gomory puts it this way:  
The principal actors in attaining [the nation’s] economic goals must be our 
corporations. But today our government does not ask U.S. corporations, or their 
leaders, to build productivity here in America; much less does it provide 
incentives for them to move in that direction . . .  
 
[Government leaders] do not realize that the corporate goal of profit maximization 
at all costs does not serve the interests of the nation. They do not realize that the 
fundamental goals of the country and of our companies have diverged. The sole 
focus on profit maximization, which leads to offshoring and holds down wages, 
does not serve the nation . . . We must act to realign the goals of company and 




Yet what is good for the overall American business community is in many ways good for 
the economy. Despite the globalization of markets, Commerce Department data indicate that 
U.S. multinational firms continue to derive 60 percent of their sales from U.S. markets (Bureau 
of Economic Affairs 2011). These and other firms that continue to rely on the U.S. market for a 
significant portion of their sales need, among other things stronger and  more sustained consumer 
purchasing power and product demand, a workforce with the education and mix of technical and 
behavioral skills needed to fill current and future vacancies, and a regulatory environment that 
encourages and rewards employers for upgrading employment practices while assuring no firms 
can gain a cost advantage by violating or minimizing employment standards. All of these goals 
lie beyond the reach of individual firms but could be attainable if businesses work together and 
with the other key stakeholders that share power and responsibilities for these issues.  
Overcoming market failures requires coordination and cooperation—a sharing of 
responsibilities—among the parties involved. That is why the key to solving America’s 
competitiveness—human capital paradox lies in developing dialogue, consensus, and 
coordinated actions among business leaders and across the business, education, labor, 
government, and other civil society institutions that share an interest in and responsibility for 
economic and social affairs.   
There also is, however, an institutional failure to overcome in taking this approach. The 
reality is that there is sparse dialogue across these groups, and what little there is tends to take 
the form of ideological posturing rather than consensus building and strategizing around shared 
national interests. Overcoming this institutional failure will require leaders to do today what their 
predecessors did in response to past national emergencies, namely, to come together around a 
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shared sense of urgency and engage in a process capable of translating their separate and shared 
interests into a strategy for investing in and fully utilizing America’s human capital.  
The nation’s jobs crisis is indeed a national emergency that should provide the shared 
sense of urgency. The labor market is failing to generate sufficient high-quality jobs to produce a 
sustainable economy. If a more comprehensive and aggressive strategy is not implemented, 
America will remain on a path of, at best, economic stagnation and slow growth. More likely, it 
will continue sliding into a long-term economic decline. Either scenario puts the nation at risk for 
an explosion of the public’s pent up anger and frustration with the lack of jobs and a declining 
standard of living.  
EVIDENCE OF UNDERVALUING HUMAN CAPITAL 
 The undervaluing of human capital is most apparent in the inability of national 
policymakers to take actions needed to address the nation’s job crisis. America has a two-
dimensional jobs crisis: it has a persistent deficit in the number of jobs needed to fully utilize its 
human capital, and it is not generating a sufficient number of high-quality jobs to meet the 
expectations and needs of its population. Yet federal policymakers have consistently put off 
addressing this crisis in favor other pressing priorities. 
The Jobs Deficit 
Figure 1 shows the depth and persistent nature of the jobs deficit in the U.S. economy by 
comparing the current situation with the recovery periods that followed prior recessions.  In 
January 2012, more than two and a half years after the end of the Great Recession, the economy 
still needed 5.8 million jobs to get back to the level that existed just prior to the start of the 
recession. An equal number (5.8 million) of jobs are needed to account for the growth in the 
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labor force over this time period. President Obama’s Jobs and Competitiveness Council 
estimates that more than 20 million new jobs will be needed by 2020 to make up for the jobs lost 
in the recession and the labor force growth that will occur throughout this decade.1  This would 
require a consistent rate of growth of 208,000 per month, or 2.5 million per year between now 
and then.  Not only is this not happening; the American economy has never sustained a rate of 
job growth this high for this length of time.  
 
Figure 1  Job Loss in Five Most Recent Recessions as Percent of Peak Employment 
 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Center for Economic and Policy Research. 
 
 
Figure 2 projects how long it would take to close the jobs deficit with different levels of 
sustained monthly job growth. In 2011 the economy created an average of 150,000 jobs per 
month. At this rate a 1.5 million jobs deficit would remain in 2020. Thus, without more direct  
 
                                                 
1 This estimate is consistent with the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ labor force projections that the labor force 
will grow by 10.5 million workers this decade (Toossi 2012). Adding the 5.8 million jobs lost between the start of 
the recession and January 2012 to the 5.8 million labor force growth since then, plus the 8.3 projected growth 




Figure 2  Years to Close the Jobs Deficit at Different Monthly Job Growth Rates 
SOURCE:  Bureau of Labor Statistics January 2012 Employment Report, Toossi (2012), and author’s calculations. 
 
 
into the next decade, along with the attendant economic and social costs of persistent 
unemployment (see Figure 3). In a recent working paper prepared for the Employment Policy 
Research Network, Til vonWachter (2011) summarizes the evidence on the consequences as 
follows: 
Increasing research suggests the cost of recessions can be large and long lasting 
for affected workers and their families. On the one hand, workers displaced from 
their stable job at stable employers when that employer experiences a mass-layoff 
suffer earnings losses extending 15 to 20 years after job loss. The long-lasting 
reductions in earnings are accompanied by an increase in job instability, and a rise 
of repeated mobility across firms, industries, and regions lasting up to 10 years. 
These large and persistent economic costs are also felt by families of displaced 
workers. In some circumstances, the parental job loss has been found to reduce 
earnings of grown children. Increasing research also suggests that health of job 
losers declines. In situations in which mass-layoffs are pervasive and earnings 
declines are substantial, these initial declines in health can give way to 
differentials in mortality also lasting for 15 to 20 years. 
 
On the other hand, individuals who enter the labor market in a recession can also 
experience lasting declines in earnings. These earnings losses are short lived for 
the highest and lowest skilled workers. Yet, for the average labor market entrant 
recovery after entry into the labor market in a severe recession can take over ten 
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years. Among college graduates, some never catch-up with their more lucky 
counterparts graduating in better economic conditions. (p. 3) 
 
Besides effects on directly involved individuals, prolonged unemployment may 
also have broader social consequences, ranging from lowering the tax base or 
creating long-term dependency to social programs, to bringing lasting declines in 
skills or underutilization of available labor. (p. 2) 
 
 
Figure 3  The Social Contract: 1947–2010 
 
SOURCE:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Economic Policy Institute. 
 
Job Quality 
Figure 4 presents a picture of the long-term trends in wages in relation to productivity 
growth. The picture portrays what a number of us have described as a “broken social contract.” 
The term relates to the expectation that wages for average workers will grow in rough tandem 
with aggregate productivity growth in the U.S. economy.  From 1947 to 1979 productivity and 
real wages both grew approximately 2–3 percent per year.  Between 1980 and 2010 productivity 
grew 84 percent, family income grew 10 percent due largely to the increased hours of paid work 
contributed by wives and mothers, and real hourly wages grew by only 5 percent.  Figure 4 
shows these effects by different education levels for men.  Since 1980 real wages for high school 
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Figure 4  Median Weekly Compensation of Men Working Full Time, 1980–2008 
 
 
SOURCE: Levy and Temin (2010).  
 
 
men remained stagnant, and the gaps between productivity growth and college graduates 
expanded albeit at lower rates. The same basic pattern has persisted over these years for female 
high school graduates. Moreover, the picture worsened in the last decade. Since 2000 wages 
have also stagnated or declined for all but those with either advanced degrees and/or others in the 
top tier of the wage distribution.  
The combined effects of these trends have produced the greatest income inequality in the 
economy since 1928. The most recent summary of the trends in income distribution indicate that 
between 1976 and 2007 the top 1 percent of the population captured 58 percent of family income 
growth. In 2007 the top 10 percent of the population received 50 percent of national income, 
compared to approximately 35 percent in 1980 (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2009).  
The alignment of wage and productivity growth from the mid 1940s through the 1970s 
resulted from two main factors. Labor markets met the demand for large numbers of production 
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workers, and equitable wage norms were supported by government policies and reinforced 
through collective bargaining and professional personnel/human resource management practices. 
The good match between these market forces, policies, and institutions set a reasonable floor on 
wages and sustained real wage growth for all workers, and particularly for those lacking a 
college education. 
 
Figure 5  Private Sector Defined-Benefit and Defined-Contribution Plan Coverage, 1979–
2009 
 
SOURCE: Employee Benefit Research Institute estimates for 1998–2008 using Department of Labor and Current Population 
Survey data. Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124131819. 
 
 
 Fringe benefits represent another key dimension of job quality. Since at least World War 
II, the United States has relied heavily on individual firms to provide health care, retirement, and 
other benefits that most other countries finance as public expenditures. Since the 1980s, 
however, coverage, value, and risks of future costs/value of these benefits have all shifted in 
ways that reduce job quality for the majority of the workforce. Employer-provided health care 
coverage grew from the 1940s through the 1970s and peaked at approximately 70 percent of the 
workforce; it then began a slow steady decline to 64 percent by 2000 and has continued to 
decline slightly since then.  Similarly, as Figure 5 illustrates, in 1979, over 40 percent of the 
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workforce was covered by a defined benefit pension plan and/or both a defined benefit and a 
defined contribution or 401(k) plan. That number declined to approximately 20 percent today, 
and most of those who continue to have a defined benefit plan are public sector employees. The 
defined contribution and 401(k) savings plans not only shift risk of retirement saving to 
employees, in the aggregate they provide a significantly lower level of retirement income. As 
illustrated in Figure 6, the Wall Street Journal estimates that the median income 60-year-old 
worker today who is covered by only a 401(k) plan will fall approximately $30,000 short of 
replacing the 85 percent of his or her preretirement income, a standard that actuaries assume as a 
target for an adequate retirement income. 
 
Figure 6  Wall Street Journal Estimates of Retirement Income Shortfalls 
SOURCE: Browning (2011). Reprinted with permission.  
 
 
Wages and benefits are not the only dimension of declining or stagnant job quality. Job 
satisfaction has been declining for the past decade, now to the point that less than half of the 
workforce reports being satisfied with their jobs (Gibbons 2010). Figure 7 tracks the decline 
from 1987 to 2009. The lowest level of satisfaction (36 percent) is reported by young (under 25 
years old) employees.  
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Figure 7  National Trends in Job Satisfaction, 1987–2009 
SOURCE: The Conference Board. Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
Note that these trends in job quality are long term, dating back to at least the 1980s. Thus, 
like the deficit in the number of jobs, there will be no quick fix capable of reversing these trends 
in job quality.  Moreover, the persistence of wage stagnation and wage inequality through at least 
four business cycles suggests that market forces alone will not reverse these trends, neither will 
politics, as in the past 30 years there have been three Republican and two Democratic 
presidential administrations. New approaches are necessary to avoid further reductions in the 
standard of living of future generations.  
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUENTS OF THE WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
 Efforts to reverse these trends need to be grounded in an accurate understanding of the 
constellation of factors that are driving them and options for addressing them that are within the 
reach of the key labor market institutions. In this section I turn to an analysis of the role of 
employers, unions, and educational institutions. 
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Employers: The Effects of Financialization 
“Human resources are our most important asset.” Although this is an often heard 
corporate mantra, evidence suggests that it does not translate into organizational actions. One 
indicator of the relative importance American business leaders assign to human capital is the 
influence and status of the top officers responsible for these issues relative to other corporate 
functions. In the past, unions served as a countervailing force that gave a voice to worker 
interests in unionized and nonunionized firms that felt a threat from potential unionization. So 
too did the expansion and vigorous enforcement of new occupational safety and health, equal 
employment opportunity and affirmative action, and other employment standards enacted in the 
1960s and 1970s (Dobbin 2009). As pressures from these two external forces declined, so did the 
influence of the corporate labor and human resource executives in charge of these 
responsibilities. 
The low relative status and influence of top corporate human resource officers can be 
observed in their compensation and their absence on corporate boards of directors and/or board 
agendas. Less than 2 percent of chief human resource officers (CHROs) are listed among the top 
five most highly compensated executives in publicly traded firms, and the few CHROs in this 
league are paid approximately 20 percent less than the other non-CEO executives (Hallock, 
Allen, and Haggerty 2008). Only 1 percent of CHROs are members of the corporate board of 
directors (Wright, Stewart, and Moore 2011). Moreover, a recent survey of the information on 
the state of human resources concludes that “. . . most boards do not get the information they 
need in order to monitor their company’s talent and they know it! A significant number (between 
40 and 50 percent) report not receiving . . . data on employee attitudes, recruiting, turnover, and 
succession management for key technical positions” (Lawler and Worley 2011, p. 118). 
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How does this lack of influence translate into key decisions affecting the workforce? One 
way to assess this is to examine how employees are treated when corporations are under stress 
from current or perceived future product or financial market developments. For years there was a 
stylized fact in the economics literature: labor was viewed as a quasi-fixed factor of production 
(Oi 1962). This is less true today than in the past, at least for men. Average tenure with an 
employer as well as the proportion of employees with 10 or more years of service with an 
employer has declined for men (Farber 2008). The average tenure for women has increased 
somewhat as their attachment to the labor force has grown over the years.  Evidence on how and 
when layoff decisions are made and received by the financial markets also indicates that the 
quasi-fixed view of human capital no longer holds in American corporations. In the last 
recession American employers turned to layoffs earlier than in past downturns, cut deeper into 
their workforces than declines in GDP would have predicted were necessary, and have been 
slower than ever before to begin hiring after the recession ended (Sum and McLaughlin 2010). In 
contrast with earlier decades, the stock market reinforces this behavior by no longer exacting a 
significant price penalty for announcing layoffs (Hallock, Strain, and Webber 2011). 
 Some of these trends in the declining value placed on human resources can be attributed 
to the globalization of markets and changes in technology that reduce the demand for labor in 
jobs that can be computerized and put a higher premium on education and skills. Part can also be 
traced to the ascendancy over time of what some are now calling the “financialization” of the 
American corporation. The quote from Gomory (2010) captures one key dimension of 
financialization—the primacy given to maximizing shareholder wealth as the purpose of the 
corporation.  This view is also a product of the post-1980 time period and part of the reason for 
the breakdown in the postwar social contract.  Michael Useem, a management scholar who has 
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studied the behavior of corporate executives and board members for several decades, recently 
summarized these developments and their consequences. 
For executives, directors and owners of large, publicly traded companies, total 
shareholder return—TSR—has been the era’s dominant mantra. Improved share 
price plus cash dividends have come to define the currency of the realm. For 
company executives, corporate directors and portfolio managers to think 
otherwise is to violate their oath of office, to fall short of their fiduciary duty.  
 
That is the formulation that has dominated the executive suite and board room for 
the past two decades. And little wonder. Institutional investors—pension funds, 
investment companies, hedge funds and other professionals that oversee giant 
portfolios—now control two-thirds of America’s publicly traded shares. This has 
given them the clout to force company leaders to focus on delivering near-term 
shareholder value above all else. Executives and directors who repeatedly fall 
short can find their careers cut short.  
 
But what might seem an idée fixe of the American way is really a moment’s 
artifice, a prescription that served a past era but less well the current one. The rise 
of investor capitalism helped force out self-serving and poorly-performing 
executives, and bolstered boardroom prevention of executive malfeasance. Yet in 
doing so, it created two byproducts that have become increasingly dysfunctional 
for both companies and the country. The first is an unrelenting pressure of the 
equity market on company leaders to meet quarterly TSR expectations, regardless 
of the impact on the domestic workforce. Many companies have consequently 
streamlined their rosters at home and expanded their operations in China, India 
and other fast-growing markets abroad. The second is an incessant equity-market 
demand on company leaders to focus on their own advantage whatever the 
disadvantage for others. Fewer executives and directors have thus been able to 
step forward to advocate what is required for a vibrant economy, not just what is 
required for their own prosperity. (Useem 2011) 
 
The 1980s witnessed major innovations in capital markets and views of the nature and 
purpose of public corporations, deregulation of financial institutions, and significant increases in 
the level of debt deemed acceptable in American firms. The increased use of junk bonds; hostile 
takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and break ups of large firms; and the new view of corporations as 
bundles of tradable assets that could be reconfigured or restructured to maximize short-term 
financial returns ushered in an era of financial capitalism. Power within corporations shifted 
from executives responsible for production, human resources, and labor relations to finance and 
15 
 
other top executives who serve as agents of increasingly demanding financial markets (Lazonick 
2009). The era of rapid escalation in CEO income began as stock options and other incentives 
linked to share price became the driving factors in their compensation packages. This further 
increased the influence of finance in human resource decision making. Recent evidence shows, 
for example, that layoffs have come faster and deeper at firms that were most heavily scrutinized 
by stock market analysts, that CEO compensation is tightly linked to share price, and in firms 
that were among the first to put CFOs in powerful management positions (Jung 2011). Others 
have found that financialization as measured by the increased ratio of profits from interest, 
dividends, and capital gains (excluding income from sale of products and services) accounts for a 
significant portion of the decline in labor’s share of national income, increased earnings 
inequality, and increased share of compensation going to top executives from the 1970s to 2007 
(Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). 
Alternative Employer Strategies: Using Human and Social Capital to Drive Innovation and 
Performance 
 Not all U.S. firms fell under the spell of these financial market pressures. Indeed, within 
nearly every industry there are examples of firms that have sought to compete with growing 
international competition and changes in technologies by staying on the cutting edge of 
innovation, product development, and service quality. To be successful, these firms have 
invested heavily in human and social capital and made good use of the collective knowledge, 
skills, and abilities of their full workforce. The human resource literature often refers to the 
bundle of practices needed to achieve high productivity and service quality as high productivity-
high wage, high-road, high-performance, or knowledge-based work systems.  
While the specific practices needed to achieve high performance with these strategies 
vary across industries, the generic features include careful selection for employees with both 
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strong technical and behavioral-social (problem solving and teamwork) skills; significant 
investment in training and development; engagement of employees at the workplace to both 
build trust and to draw on their knowledge to solve problems, coordinate operations, and drive 
innovations; compensation systems that align employee and firm interests; and labor 
management partnerships in settings where employees are represented by a union and/or 
professional association. Two decades of research on companies adopting these human resource 
systems has documented their ability to achieve world class productivity and service quality in 
industries as diverse as steel, autos, airlines, telecommunications, apparel, health care, 
computers, and semiconductors (Appelbaum, Gittell, and Leana 2011; Ton 2012). More recent 
case studies are now documenting the same patterns of success in smaller firms across 
manufacturing, retail, and health care establishments (Hitachi Foundation 2011). 
 This high-road strategy is critical because, compared to strategies that seek to minimize 
labor costs and focus on short-term returns, it is better able to achieve the twin objectives of 
building and sustaining strong competitive companies that generate consistent returns to 
shareholders and support high and rising wages and living standards for employees. It is the 
contemporary means of achieving a new “social contract” in which workers’ incomes, 
employment conditions, and living standards advance in tandem with the productivity they help 
to generate. Moreover, even in the current world in which employment security and longevity are 
more uncertain, these work systems build and help keep current employees’ human capital and 
thereby provide a rich stock of human capital for American industry to draw on when hiring. 
 The problem is that these practices and systems are not diffusing widely across American 
industries. In fact, their prevalence may have declined somewhat in the past decade (Benson and 




 a lack of information about these practices and how to implement/manage them;  
 the high start-up costs and delayed benefits that come with these (and any other) 
investments, sometimes called “worse before better” traps);  
 failure to eliminate the “low road” option of competing by holding labor costs as low as 
possible;  
 failure to reform and modernize labor law to encourage and support these strategies and 
practices; and the pressures from financial market agents for maximizing short-term 
returns.  
 
 There may, however, be a greater reason why these human capital–driven strategies are 
not diffusing or are in fact declining. A market failure may be at work here as well. As employee 
tenure declines and more parts of a firm’s value chain are outsourced, the incentive for an 
individual firm to invest broadly and deeply in these practices also declines. Indeed, the most 
recent fad in the human resource management literature is to emphasize “talent management” of 
key executives and other individuals and groups deemed most critical rather than invest in the 
firm’s overall workforce. This may be rational behavior for an individual firm, but it is not 
optimal for maintaining and building the human capital stock across the value chain or across 
American industry.  
Very likely all of these factors, and perhaps others, play a role. The net effect of limited 
diffusion of this way of competing and managing human resources is to create a two equilibria 
economy: some firms compete on the high-road, knowledge-driven strategies, while others 
compete on the low-road, labor cost–minimization strategy. To date, more have chosen the latter 
than the former. This puts these high-road firms on the defensive and discourages others from 
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following their lead. The key challenge, if America is to be a competitive economy at high and 
rising living standards, lies in tipping the balance in favor of the former so that the low-road 
firms are forced to upgrade their practices and employment standards to remain competitive. 
This will require overcoming the barriers and market failure noted above. 
Start-up Firms 
 The above discussion focuses on changes that occurred in existing firms over the past 
three decades. What about new start-ups and small firms—the source of a substantial number of 
the new jobs created in the U.S. economy (Neumark, Wall, and Zhang 2011)? Have recent 
entrepreneurs avoided the financial market pressures for short-term results and created higher-
quality jobs? While the evidence is limited, it appears that the same variation in practices exists 
among start-ups and small firms. A study of Silicon Valley start-ups in the 1990s found, for 
example, that only about half (57 percent) of start-ups were built around practices that sought to 
gain competitive advantage through teamwork and/or individual talent; the rest followed 
traditional command and control managerial strategies and practices (Hannan, Burton, and Baron 
1996). On average, small firms pay lower wages and benefits, provide less training, and have 
higher employment volatility and greater likelihood of failure than large firms (Litwin and Phan 
2011; Shane 2008;). Yet, as with large, older firms, within most industries there are examples of 
young, smaller firms that pay above average wages and achieve above average productivity 
(Hitachi Foundation 2011; Ton 2012). Moreover, there are the highly visible success stories like 
Southwest Airlines and Google that have grown rapidly and are recognized for their high wages 
and leading employment practices. Thus, the same diffusion challenge facing high-performance 
work practices in large firms appears to be an issue in entrepreneurial start-up firms as well. 
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Unions and Collective Bargaining 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, unions served as the principle and most 
powerful voice for the American workforce. Through collective bargaining and the threat of 
unionization, unions helped construct and sustain the social contract that kept wages and 
productivity moving in tandem and in doing so upgraded the quality of the jobs that had 
previously been low-wage, unsafe, and subject to arbitrary treatment by managers and 
supervisors. Unions have now declined to the point that they no longer can give voice to 
America’s workforce, serve as a countervailing power in industry, or engage business leaders in 
fashioning a new social contract tailored to the modern workforce and economy. America 
therefore faces some strategic questions: What will fill this void? Will society default to more 
government regulations of employment relations? If unions, professional associations, or other 
forms of collective voice are to play a role, what would a twenty-first century models of these 
organizations look like?  What changes in labor law and policy are needed to support new 
models?  
Union membership in the private sector reached a peak of about one-third of the 
workforce in the mid-1950s. It declined slowly but steadily through the 1960s and 1970s, 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, and now stands at 6.9 percent of private sector worker and 
11.9 percent overall. Union decline has multiple causes, including the shift from blue-collar to 
white-collar work, the decline of manufacturing jobs to global competition and technological 
change, waning effectiveness of labor law in the context of increased managerial opposition to 
union organizing, and the failure of unions to adopt new strategies to respond to these 
developments.  
In contrast to these trends in membership, worker interest in joining unions has increased 
over the years. Nationally representative surveys in the 1970s found that 30 percent of nonunion 
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workers would join a union if given the chance (Kochan 1979); that number increased to around 
50 percent by the end of the 1990s (Freeman 2007). Yet the reality today is that the employers, 
not the workers, determine whether workers who want a union will be able to get one. An 
employer that is determined to avoid unionization through legal and/or illegal means has a 90 
percent likelihood of being successful, even when a majority of workers sign a statement 
indicating they want union representation (Ferguson 2008). Among firms that have no union 
presence and no active union organizing drives, the threat of unions and collective bargaining is 
almost, if not totally, nonexistent. 
As unions declined so did the bargaining power and innovative capacity of collective 
bargaining. By the mid 1980s union coverage declined sufficiently so that unions could no 
longer rely on strike threats as a source of bargaining power or use pattern bargaining to spread 
wage increases beyond their specific bargaining units. Innovative labor management partnerships 
that were competitive with the best of nonunion models emerged in a number of industries such 
as autos, steel, telecommunications, and others, but without labor law reforms needed to support 
and endorse them, the innovations failed to diffuse broadly enough to become the new norm 
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). The result has been a downward spiral: it was easier for 
firms to avoid unions than to work with them to transform relationships and work practices. The 
threat effects of unions on new operations evaporated, and the pressure to match union wages 
and benefits eroded. Collective bargaining has never recovered its pre-1980s momentum. Recent 
evidence suggests that union decline accounts for approximately one-third of the increase in 
income inequality experienced since the 1980s (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). 
Despite these trends, some unions have partnered with companies to foster high-road, 
high-productivity relationships. Southwest, the most highly unionized U.S. airline, is also the 
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most productive and profitable, pays industry-leading wages, consistently ranks at or near the top 
of the industry in customer satisfaction, and is rated as one of the 100 best places in America to 
work (Gittell 2004). Health insurer and provider Kaiser Permanente and its coalition of unions 
have maintained a comprehensive labor–management partnership for nearly 15 years. During 
this period, the company turned around its finances, supported steady growth in wages, used 
advanced problem-solving techniques to negotiate new labor agreements, gained national 
acclaim as a leader in the use of electronic medical record technologies, and improved employee 
and patient satisfaction (Kochan et al. 2009). 
Demise of Business, Labor, Government Dialogue 
 Another casualty of union decline has been the demise in forums for dialogue and 
communication among labor and business leaders in society that could be instrumental for 
addressing the market failures noted above. Although America has never had a tradition of 
formal consultative structures at the national level (except in wartime), various presidents 
(Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter) have had informal labor management 
consultative groups. A variety of private groups also brought labor and business leaders together 
for discussion of national issues such as the National Planning Association (later renamed the 
National Policy Association), the Collective Bargaining Forum, Work in America Institute, the 
Council on Competitiveness, and in one case a private group created and chaired by former 
Secretary of Labor and Harvard Professor John Dunlop. All of these have gone away or are 
largely invisible.  
Efforts to revise a national dialogue have failed, even in times of crisis. Proposals were 
rejected for high-level government leaders to bring business and labor together in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and when the Obama 
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administration was being formed in the midst of the deep financial crisis. There is a vacuum in 
dialogue between business and labor leaders that needs to be filled.  
Education 
It is standard practice to argue that America needs to improve basic education outcomes 
to ensure the future workforce has world class competitive knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
American student performance on standard math and science tests has declined relative to 
students in a number of other countries. The percentage of young adults obtaining a four-year 
college degree grew steadily for much of the twentieth century, but then leveled off (it actually 
declined for men) in the 1980s and grew at a much slower rate in the past two decades, despite, 
as noted earlier, the increased demand and wage premium for college graduates  (Goldin and 
Katz 2008).  Enrollment in America’s community colleges has grown, particularly in recent 
years, in the face of rising unemployment and changing skill requirements; however, the rate of 
completion of community college degrees remains low and problematic. The percentage of 
college students pursuing math, science, or engineering degrees remains at a low 15 percent.  
 Equal concerns are voiced about the quality and skill mix of the adult labor force. 
Employers report shortages of key technical skills needed to work with advanced technologies 
and worry about the demographic cliffs facing key occupations and industries as skilled workers 
and technicians approach retirement (American Society for Training and Development 2006; 
McKinsey Global Institute 2011). A key question, therefore, is what mix of public and private 
resources and institutions are needed to build and maintain the nation’s human capital stock? 
Government training programs have always been relatively small, and those that exist 
have gotten smaller over time, with the exception of the one-time upsurge in training investments 
provided by the 2009 stimulus package. In 2012 the Department of Labor budgeted 
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approximately $3 billion for adult training. The Department of Education spent about the same 
amount on Pell grants or other support for college students. Measured against the growth in the 
labor force, expenditures have declined as well.  
Estimates of private sector expenditures on training are notoriously unreliable. One 
national survey of employees shows declines in participation in training between 1996 and 2003, 
while another survey with somewhat differently worded questions shows increases between 1999 
and 2005 (Lerman 2011). The best estimates are that American firms spend somewhere between 
$70 and $100 billion per year on training (Lerman 2011). The bulk of private sector training is 
spent on managers and more highly educated professionals in executive education programs and 
tuition reimbursement for retaining or advancing professional certifications. While these 
investments are important, they do not reach deeply into the ranks of the workforce or address 
the current and/or future shortage of midlevel employees with the mathematical, technical, and 
behavioral–social skills needed to staff advanced manufacturing or service operations and 
industries. Filling this need will require significant expansion in the range of who gets access to 
training, the length of training, and the mix of classroom and on-the-job training programs. 
Bishop’s (1995) review suggests that the individual and social returns to employer sponsored 
training could be substantial if the disincentives to individual firms to finance general and 
vocational training could be overcome. The Urban Institute (2011) agrees and notes that a good 
deal has been learned over the years about the forms, duration, and organizational linkages that 
are essential to generating these potential returns:  
Research has shown that workforce development works, but how we go about it 
matters. We know that training is more effective if it’s intensive, long-term, and 
workplace-based, such as on-the-job training, apprenticeships, or internships. 
Giving individuals real work experience while in training develops skills better 
than stand-alone training does. And this applies to all skill levels—whether 
someone is studying for a two-year degree or a PhD—if they don’t understand 
24 
 
how their education and skills relate to a job, their workplace success will be 
limited.  
 
 One form of training where more data are available on trends, scope, and effects is 
registered apprenticeship programs. Between 1998 and 2010 the number of Department of Labor 
registered apprenticeship programs declined by 36 percent, from 41,000 to 26, 000. In 2010 only 
376,000 workers were enrolled in these programs—less than 0.3 percent of the labor force, or an 
estimated 4 percent of each new cohort of labor force entrants (Lerman 2011).  The miniscule 
size and the decline in apprenticeships are particularly unfortunate since apprenticeships have 
high economic returns to graduates and achieve nearly universally positive evaluations and 
endorsements from employers that sponsor them. One study estimates the returns to 
apprenticeship of over $50,000 two years after completion with a lifetime net present value of 
$266,000. This compares to about $8,000 short-term and $104,000–$130,000 lifetime present 
value of completing a community college degree (Hollenbeck 2008). Employer sponsors cite 
increased productivity, morale, safety, and confidence in the skill levels of potential recruits as 
the primary benefits to apprenticeship. Given these sizable benefits and strong endorsements, and 
concerns over skill shortages and the aging of the labor force, apprenticeship models would 
appear to be particularly good candidates for expansion. 
Business Schools 
Universities may be contributing to the decline in the value and influence of human 
capital in industry. Most business schools, for example, teach relatively little about how to 
compete and manage for high performance, high wages, and varying employment conditions. 
Human resource courses have largely been eliminated from core MBA curricula, and labor 
relations is not taught at all in most major business schools today. Just as in corporations, the 
power of finance has ascended, and the view of the corporation as a shareholder-maximizing 
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institution dominates both the teaching and the culture of most leading business schools. 
Consulting and financial services pay the highest salaries to MBA graduates and therefore are 
viewed as the most prestigious and coveted industries and careers. These two industries have 
absorbed the majority of MBA graduates over the past decade at business schools such as 
Harvard (37 percent into financial services and 24 percent into consulting) and MIT (27 percent 
into financial services and 29 percent into consulting). Nationally, financial services accounted 
for a significantly higher proportion of compensation and national income in the past two 
decades than in prior years (Blair 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011)   
SOLVING THE PARADOX: A JOBS COMPACT 
 The above analysis has identified four barriers to overcoming the paradox that keeps 
America from translating rhetoric about the importance of human capital to the economy into 
reality. 
1) It is not necessarily in the interests of individual firms to compete, invest, and manage in 
ways necessary to gain value from human capital. 
2) Strategies and practices capable of achieving both high productivity and high wages are 
not diffusing across firms. 
3) While it may be in the interests of the American business community to elevate human 
capital as a source of competitive advantage, it cannot do this alone without the support 
of government, labor, or education stakeholders. The same is true for each of these other 
stakeholder groups—none can do it without the support of the others. 
4) There is insufficient dialogue across these groups to achieve a collective effort to do so. 
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Labor market institutions need to come together in a coordinated effort to address market 
and institutional failures—yet the odds are low that the key stakeholder groups will initiate a 
dialogue on their own that is capable of overcoming the barriers noted above. A new approach is 
needed. In a follow-up policy brief (Kochan 2012), I propose a way forward by providing a 
concrete set of job creation options that, if taken together, should be sufficient to both close the 
jobs deficit and put the economy back on a path of improving wages and other aspects of job 
quality. But new leadership is needed to get this process started.  Specifically, I suggest that 
education leaders build on the ideas expressed by business and labor leaders who attended the 
Harvard Business School Competitiveness Summit by convening national and regional forums to 
build commitment to a Jobs Compact capable of creating and sustaining the 20 million new high-
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